

Privacy and Security in the Genomic Era

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Abstract

Genome sequencing technology has advanced at a rapid pace and it is now possible to generate highly-detailed genotypes inexpensively. The collection and analysis of such data has the potential to support various applications, including personalized medical services. While the benefits of the genomics revolution are trumpeted by the biomedical community, the increased availability of such data has major implications for personal privacy; notably because the genome has certain essential features, which include (but are not limited to) *(i)* an association with certain diseases, *(ii)* identification capability (e.g., forensics), and *(iii)* revelation of family relationships. Moreover, direct-to-consumer DNA testing increases the likelihood that genome data will be made available in less regulated environments, such as the Internet and for-profit companies. The problem of genome data privacy thus resides at the crossroads of computer science, medicine, and public policy. While the computer scientists have addressed data privacy for various data types, there has been less attention dedicated to genomic data. Thus, the goal of this paper is to provide a systematization of knowledge for the computer science community. In doing so, we address some of the (sometimes erroneous) beliefs of this field and we report on a survey we conducted about genome data privacy with biomedical specialists. Then, after characterizing the genome privacy problem, we review the state-of-the-art regarding privacy attacks on genomic data and strategies for mitigating such attacks, as well as contextualizing these attacks from the perspective of medicine and public policy. This paper concludes with an enumeration of the challenges for genome data privacy and presents a framework to systematize the analysis of threats and the design of countermeasures as the field moves forward.

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I Introduction

The genomic era began with the announcement ten years ago that the Human Genome Project (HGP) had completed its goals [Guttmacher and Collins, 2003]. The technology associated with genome sequencing has progressed at a rapid pace, and this has coincided with the rise of cheap computing and communication technologies. Consequentially, it is now possible to collect, store, process, and share genomic data in a manner that was unthinkable at the advent of the HGP. In parallel with this trend there has been significant progress on understanding and using genomic data that fuels a rising hunger to broaden the number of individuals who make use of their genomes and to support research to expand the ways in which genomes can be used. This rise in the availability and use of genomic data has lead to many concerns about its security and privacy. These concerns have been addressed with efforts to provide technical protections and a corresponding series of demonstrations of vulnerabilities. Given that much more research is needed and expected in this area, this seems like a good point to overview and systematize what has been done in the last decade and provide ideas on a framework to aid future efforts.

To provide context, consider that it was not until the early 1990s when sequencing the human genome was posited as a scientific endeavor. The first attempt for *whole genome sequencing*¹ (a laboratory process that maps the full DNA sequence of an individual’s genome) was initiated at the U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) in 1990 and the first full sequence was released 13 years later at a total cost of \$3 billion. Yet, sequencing technology has evolved and costs have plummeted, such that the price for a whole genome sequence is currently \$6K² and can be completed in two to three days. The “\$1K genome in 1 day” will soon be a reality.

Decreases in sequencing costs have coincided with an escalation in genomics as a research discipline with explicit application possibilities. Genomic data is increasingly incorporated in a variety of domains, including healthcare (e.g., personalized medicine), biomedical research (e.g., discovery of novel genome-phenome associations), direct-to-consumer (DTC) services (e.g., disease risk tests), and forensics (e.g., criminal investigations). For example, it is now possible for physicians to prescribe the “right drug at the right time” (for certain drugs) according to the makeup of their patients’ genome [Bielinski *et al.*, 2014; Overby *et al.*, 2010; Gottesman *et al.*, 2013a; Pulley *et al.*, 2012].

To some people, genomic data is considered (and treated) no different than traditional health data (such as what might be recorded in one’s medical record) or any other type of data more generally [Bains, 2010; Rothstein, 2005]. While genomic data may not be “exceptional” in its own right, it has many features that distinguish it (discussed in depth in the following section) and there is a common belief that it should be handled (e.g., that is stored, processed, and

¹In this study, we refer to the process of obtaining the Whole Genome Sequence (WGS) or the Whole Exome Sequence (WES) as *sequencing* and the process of obtaining the variants (usually only single nucleotide polymorphisms, or SNPs) as *genotyping*.

²<http://goo.gl/UdxsP8>

managed) with care. The privacy issues associated with genomic data are complex, particularly because such data has a wide range of uses and provides information on more than just the individual from which the data was derived. Yet, perhaps most importantly, there is a great fear of the unknown. Every day, we learn something new about the genome, whether it be knowledge of a new association with a particular disease or proof against a previously reported association. We have yet to discover everything there is from DNA, which makes it almost impossible to assign exact value, and thus manage DNA as a personal asset (or public good). So, as the field of genomics evolves, so too will the views on the privacy-sensitivity of genomic data. As this paper progresses, we review some of the common beliefs revolving around genome privacy. And, in doing, we report on the results of a survey we conducted with biomedical specialists regarding their perspective on genomic data privacy issues.

It should be recognized that there exist numerous publications on technical, ethical, and legal aspects of genomics and privacy. The research in the field covers privacy-preserving handling of genomic data in various environments (as will be reviewed in this paper). Yet, there are several challenges to ensuring that genomics and privacy walk hand-in-hand. One of the challenges that computer scientists face is that these views tend to be focused on one aspect of the problem in a certain setting with a certain discipline’s perspective. From the perspective of computer science, there is a need for a complete framework which shows *(i)* what type of security and privacy requirements are needed in each step of the handling of genomic data, *(ii)* a characterization of the various threat models that are realized at each step, and *(iii)* open computational research problems. By providing such a framework in this paper, we are able to illustrate the important problems of genomic privacy to computer science researchers working on security and privacy problems more generally.

Related Surveys and Articles. Privacy issues caused by forensic, medical and other uses of genomic data have been studied in the past few years [Stajano *et al.*, 2008; Stajano, 2009; Malin, 2005a; Naveed, 2014; Cristofaro, 2014]. A recent survey [Erich and Narayanan, 2013] discusses identity breaches using genomic data and proposes methods for protection. It addresses topics that we discuss in Sections VI and Section IX of this paper. In Section IX we present an end-to-end picture for the handling of genomic data in a variety of contexts as shown in Figure 9, while [Erich and Narayanan, 2013] discusses how access control, data anonymization and cryptographic techniques can be used to prevent genetic privacy breaches. Moreover, [Erich and Narayanan, 2013] has been written for a general audience, whereas this paper is meant for computer scientists (and in particular security and privacy specialists).

Contributions. The main contributions of this paper are:

- We provide an *extensive literature survey*³ of computer science as well as medical literature about genome privacy.

³In this paper, the word “survey” is used to mean *literature survey* as well as *opinion poll*, however, the meaning will be clear from the context.

- We report on the results of an *expert survey (opinion poll)* we conducted with biomedical specialists’ regarding their point of view on the security and privacy of genomic data.
- We develop an end-to-end *framework for the security and privacy of genomic data* in a variety of healthcare, biomedical research, legal and forensics and direct-to-consumer contexts.
- We present what we believe to be the first document that reflects the *opinions of computer science, medical, and legal researchers* for this important topic.

We also provide an online tutorial⁴ of biology and other related material to define technical terms used in this (and other) paper(s) on the security and privacy of genomic data. The remainder of this SoK is organized as follows. Section II explains to what extent genomic data is distinct from data in general and health information in particular. Section III provides an overview of uses of genomic data for the non-specialist. Section IV emphasizes the relevance of genome privacy. Section V reports on the findings of a survey we conducted with 61 biomedical researchers regarding the importance of genomic data privacy and security. Sections VI and VII provide literature surveys, where the former summarizes the problem (i.e., the privacy risk) and the latter summarizes possible solutions. Section VIII summarizes the challenges for genomic medicine and privacy. Based on this analysis, Section IX offers a general framework for privacy-preserving handling of genomic data, including an extensive threat model that discusses what type of attacks are possible at each step of the data flow. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section IX.J.3.

II Essential features of genomic data

Consider the following scenario. Alice decides to have her genome sequenced by a service called MyGenome.com that keeps her data in a repository and gives Alice information about it over time. At first she uses information from MyGenome to explore parts of her family tree and contribute her genomic data, along with some facts about herself, to support medical research on diseases of her choosing. Many years after MyGenome performed the initial sequencing, Alice began experiencing health problems for which she visited a doctor who used her genomic data to help diagnose a likely cause and customize a treatment based on variation in her genome sequence. Alice was impressed by this experience and wondered what other conditions might be in her future. After some exploration she discovered that evidence (based on published research papers) suggested a high risk of dementia for people with her genomic profile. She worried that various parties, including MyGenome, the genealogy service, and research studies with whom she shared her data, might share this and other information in ways that she did not expect or intend and whether this might have undesired consequences for her.

⁴Available at <https://sites.google.com/site/genomicssok/>




Figure 1: Properties of DNA that, in combination, may distinguish it from other data types.

Alice’s story highlights several of the essential features of genomic data. We depict six of them in Figure 1, which we review for orientation of the reader.

How does the result of a DNA-based lab test differ from that of other tests? One notable feature is how it is static and of long-lived value. Most tests, especially ones Alice could do for herself, like taking her temperature and blood pressure, are of relatively short term value, whereas genomic data changes little over a lifetime and may have value that lasts for decades. Of course, there are some exceptions to this longevity. For instance, sequencing techniques improve in accuracy over time, so tests may be repeated to improve reliability. Additionally, there are some modifications in DNA that accumulate over time (e.g., shortening of the ends of DNA strands due to aging [Harley *et al.*, 1990]). Most particularly, somatic mutations occur resulting in some degree of mosaicism in every individual: the most striking examples are the deleterious modifications of the DNA observed in cancer cells in comparison to DNA derived from normal cells. However, this long-lasting value means that holding and using genomic data over extended periods of time, as Alice did, is likely.

Alice’s first use of her genomic data is expected to be a key driver for application development in the future. While DNA has been used for some time in parentage tests, it can be generalized from such studies to enable broader inference of kinship relations. Services such as Ancestry.com and 23andme.com already offer kinship services based on DNA testing. While a substantial portion of Alice’s DNA is in common with that of her relatives, it is also unique to her (unless she has an identical twin). This has another set of implications about potential use of genomic data, like its ability to link to her personally, a property that makes DNA testing useful in criminal forensics.

Another of the essential values of DNA relates to its ability for diagnosing problems in health and behavior. Tests are able to demonstrate increased likelihood for conditions like macular degeneration in old age and Alzheimer’s (the most common form of dementia) [Goldman *et al.*, 2011]. Although these are

often probabilities, they can have diagnostic value as well as privacy ramifications [Seddon *et al.*, 2011]. For instance, if Alice’s relatives learned about her increased risk of dementia, might they (consciously or unconsciously) trust her judgement a little less? Or might they instead help her to get timely treatment? This power for good and bad has led genomic data to have a certain “mystique”, which has been promoted by scientists and the media [Tambor *et al.*, 2002]. Although there are many other types of tests (e.g., protein sequence tests) that carry key common information with DNA tests, there is a special status that DNA data has come to occupy, a status that some have phrased as “exceptional” [Bains, 2010]. These special fears about the sharing of genomic data, whether founded or not, cannot be ignored when considering privacy implications. Hence, while DNA data may or may not be exceptional [Evans *et al.*, 2010; Gostin and Hodge, 1999], it is special in many ways, and hence warrants particular care.

III Uses of Genomic Data

An individual’s genomic sequence contains over 3 billion base pairs, which are distributed across twenty-three chromosomes. Despite its size, it is estimated that the DNA of two individuals differ by no more than 0.5% [Venter *et al.*, 2001]; but it is these differences that influence an individual’s health status and other aspects (as discussed in Section II). To provide further context for the importance of genomic data, this section reviews several of the major applications in practice and under development.

III.A Healthcare

First, it has been recognized that mutation in an individual’s genomic sequence can influence his well being. In some cases, changes in a particular gene will have an adverse effect on a person’s health immediately or at some point in the future (i.e., the *one gene, one disease*, or OGOD, model) [Botstein and Risch, 2003]. As of 2014, there were over 1,600 of these traits reported on in the literature⁵, ranging from metabolic disorders (e.g., phenylketonuria, which is caused by a mutation in the PKU gene) to neurodegenerative diseases (e.g., Huntington’s chorea, which is caused by a mutation in the HD gene [MacDonald *et al.*, 1993]) to blood disorders (e.g., Sickle cell anemia, caused by a mutation in the HBB gene [Saiki *et al.*, 1985]). While some of these diseases are manageable through changes in diet or pharmacological treatments, others are not and have no known intervention to assist in the improvement of an individual’s health status. Nonetheless, some individuals choose to learn their genetic status, so that they may order their affairs accordingly and contribute to medical research [Mastromauro *et al.*, 1987] (as elaborated upon below). Moreover, genetic tests can be applied in a prenatal setting to detect a variety of factors

⁵<http://goo.gl/oQtb7u>

that can influence health outcomes (e.g., if a fetus is liable to have a congenital defect that could limit its lifespan, such as Tay-Sach’s disease) [Lippman, 1991].

Yet, the majority of variations in an individual’s genome do not follow the OGD model. Rather, it has been shown that variation is associated with change in the susceptibility of an individual to a certain disease or behavior [Botstein and Risch, 2003]. Cancer-predisposing variants in genes such as BRCA1/2 or the Lynch Syndrome are well-known examples. Such variation may also modify an individual’s ability to respond to a pharmaceutical agent. For instance, some individuals are strong (weak) metabolizers, such that they may require a lesser (greater) amount of a drug than is standard practice, or may gain the greatest benefit from a different drug entirely. This variation has been leveraged to provide dosing for several medications in practice, including blood thinners after heart surgery (to prevent clotting) and hypertension management (to lessen the severity of heart disease) [Pulley *et al.*, 2012]. Additionally, changes in an individual’s genome detected in a tumor cell can inform which medications are most appropriate to treat cancer [McDermott *et al.*, 2011].

III.B Research

While the genome has been linked with a significant number of disorders and variable responses to treatments, new associations are being discovered on a weekly basis. Technology for performing such basic research continues to undergo rapid advances [Brunham and Hayden, 2012]. The dramatic decrease in the cost of genome sequencing has made it increasingly possible to collect, store, and computationally analyze genomic sequencing data on a fine-grained level, as well as over populations on the order of millions of people (e.g., China’s Kadoorie biobank [Chen *et al.*, 2011] and UK Biobank [Allen *et al.*, 2014] will each contain genomic data on 500,000 individuals by the end of 2014, while the U.S. National Cancer Institute is at the beginning of its Million Cancer Genome Project [Haussler *et al.*, 2012]). Yet, it should be recognized that computational analysis is separate from, and more costly than, sequencing technology itself (e.g., the \$1K *analysis* of a genome is far from being developed).

Moreover, technological advances in genome sequencing are coalescing with a big data revolution in the healthcare domain. Large quantities of data derived from electronic health records (EHRs), for instance, are being made available to support research on clinical phenotypes that, until several years ago, were deemed to be too noisy and complex to model [Gottesman *et al.*, 2013b]. As a consequence, genome sequences have become critical components of the biomedical research process [Kohane, 2011].

III.C Direct-to-Consumer Services

Historically, genome sequencing was a complex and expensive process that, as a result, was left to large research laboratories or diagnostic services, but in the past several years, there has been a rise in DTC genome sequencing from various

companies [Prainsack and Vayena, 2013]. These services have made it affordable for individuals to become directly involved in the collection, processing, and even analysis of their genomic data. The DTC movement has enabled individuals to learn about their disease susceptibility risks (as alluded to earlier), and even perform genetic compatibility tests with potential partners. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, DTC has made it possible for individuals to be provided with digital representations of their genome sequences, such that they can control how such information is disclosed, to whom, and when.

Of course, not all consumer products are oriented toward health applications. For example, genomic data is increasingly applied to determine and/or track kinship. This information has been applied for instance to track an individual’s ancestral heritage and determine the extent to which individuals with the same surname are related with respect to their genomic variance [Jobling, 2001].

III.D Legal and Forensic

Given the static nature of genomic sequences, this information has often been used for investigative purposes. For instance, this information may be applied in contested parentage suits [Anderlik, 2003]. Moreover, DNA found at a crime scene (or on a victim) may be used as evidence by law enforcement to track down suspected criminals [Kaye and Smith, 2003]. It is not unheard of for residents of a certain geographic region to be compelled to provide tissue samples to law enforcement to help in such investigations [Greely *et al.*, 2006]. Given the kinship relationships that such information communicates, DNA from an unknown suspect has been compared to relatives to determine the corresponding individual’s likely identity in order to better facilitate a manhunt.

One of the concerns of such uses, however, is that it is unclear how law enforcement may retain and/or use this information in the future. The U.S. Supreme Court recently ruled that it is permissible for law enforcement to collect and retain DNA on suspects, even if the suspects are not subsequently prosecuted [Liptak, 2013]. Once DNA is shed by an individual (such as from saliva left on a coffee cup in a restaurant) it has been legislated as an “abandoned” resource [Joh, 2006], such that the corresponding individual relinquishes rights of ownership. While the notion of “abandoned DNA” remains a hotly contested issue, it is currently the case in the U.S. that DNA collected from discarded materials can be sequenced and used by anyone without the consent of the individual from which it was derived.

IV Relevance of Genomic Privacy

As discussed in Section II, genomic data has numerous distinguishing features and applications. As a consequence, the leakage of this information may have serious implications if misused, as in genetic discrimination (e.g., for insurance, employment, or education) or blackmail [Gottlieb, 2001]. A true story exemplifying genetic discrimination was shared by Dr. Noralane Lindor at the Mayo

Clinic’s Individualizing Medicine Conference (2012) [Lindor, 2012]. During her study of a cancer patient, Dr. Lindor also sequenced the grandchildren of her patient, two of whom turned out to have the mutation for the same type of cancer⁶. One of these grandchildren applied to the U.S. army to become a helicopter pilot. Even though genetic testing is not a required procedure for military recruitment, as soon as she revealed that she previously went through the aforementioned genetic test, she was rejected for the position (in this case legislation does not apply to military recruitment, as will be discussed below).

Ironically, the familial aspect of genomics complicates the problems revolving around privacy. A recent example is the debate between the family members of Henrietta Lacks and the medical researchers [Skloot, 2013]. Ms. Lacks (deceased in 1951) was diagnosed with cervical cancer and some of her cancer cells were removed for medical research. These cells later paved the way to important developments in medical treatment. Recently, researchers sequenced and published Ms. Lacks’s genome without asking the consent of her living family members. These relatives learned this information from the author of the best-selling book “The Immortal Life of Henrietta Lacks” [Skloot and Turpin, 2010], and they expressed the concern that the sequence contained information about her family members. After complaints, the researchers took her genomic data down from public databases. However, the privacy-sensitive genomic information of the members of the Lacks family was already compromised because some of the data had already been downloaded and many investigators had previously published parts of the cells’ sequence. Although the NIH entered into an agreement with the Lacks family to give them a voice in the use of these cells [Ritter, 2013], there is no consensus about the scope of control that individuals and their families ought to have over the downstream of their cells. Thousands of people, including James Watson [APOC, 2009], have placed their genomic data on the Web without seeking permission of their relatives.

One of the often voiced concerns regarding genomic data is its potential for discrimination. While, today, certain genome-disease and genome-trait associations are known, we do not know what will be inferred from one’s genomic data in the future. In fact, a grandson of Henrietta Lacks expressed his concern about the public availability of his grandmother’s genome by saying that “the main issue was the privacy concern and what information in the future might be revealed”. Therefore, it is likely that the privacy-sensitivity of genomic data, and thus the potential threats will increase with time.

Threats emerging from genomic data are only possible via the leakage of such data, and, in today’s healthcare system, there are several candidates for the source of this leakage. Genomic data can be leaked through a reckless clinician, the IT of a hospital (e.g., through a breach of the information security), or the sequencing facility. If the storage of such data is outsourced to a third party, data can also be leaked from such a database through a hacker’s activity or a disgruntled employee. Similarly, if the genomic data is stored by the individual

⁶Having a genetic mutation for cancer only probabilistically increases the predisposition to cancer.

himself (e.g., on his smartphone), it can be leaked due to a malware. Furthermore, surprisingly, sometimes the leakage is performed by the genome owner. For example, on a genome-sharing website, OpenSNP.org, people upload the variants in their genomes – sometimes with their identifying material, including their real names.

One way of protecting the privacy of individuals’ genomic data is through the law or via policy. In 2007, the U.S. adopted the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which prohibits certain types of discrimination in access to health insurance and employment. Similarly, the U.S. Presidential report on genome privacy [[Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues, 2012](#)] discusses policies and techniques to protect the privacy of genomic data. In 2008, the Council of Europe adopted the convention concerning genetic testing for health purposes [[Council of Europe, 2008](#)]. There are, in fact, hundreds of legal systems in the world, ranging in scope from federal to state / province, and municipality level and each can adopt different definitions, rights, and responsibilities for an individual’s privacy. Yet, while such legislation may be put into practice, it is challenging to enforce because the uses of data cannot always be detected. Additionally, legal regimes may be constructed such that they are subject to interpretation or leave loopholes in place. For example, GINA does not apply to life insurance or the military [[Altman and Klein, 2002](#)]. Therefore, legislation alone, while critical in shaping the norms of society, is insufficient to prevent privacy violations.

The idea of using technical solutions to guarantee the privacy of such sensitive and valuable data brings about interesting debates. On one hand, the potential importance of genomic data for mankind is tremendous. Yet, privacy-enhancing technologies may be considered as an obstacle to achieving these goals. Technological solutions for genome privacy can be achieved by various techniques, such as cryptography or obfuscation (proposed solutions are discussed in detail in [Section VII](#)). Yet, cryptographic techniques typically reduce the efficiency of the algorithms, introducing more computational overload, while preventing the users of such data from “viewing” the data. And, obfuscation-based methods, reduce the accuracy (or utility) of genomic data. Therefore, especially when human life is at stake, the applicability of such privacy-enhancing techniques for genomic data is questionable.

On the other hand, to expedite advances in personalized medicine, genome-phenome association studies often require the participation of a large number of research participants. To encourage individuals to enroll in such studies, it is crucial to adhere to ethical principles, such as autonomy, reciprocity and trust more generally (e.g., guarantee that genomic data will not be misused). Considering today’s legal systems, the most reliable way to provide such trust pledges may be to use privacy-enhancing technologies for the management of genomic data. It would severely discredit a medical institution’s reputation if it failed to fulfill the trust requirements for the participants of a medical study. More importantly, a violation of trust could slow down genomic research (e.g., by causing individuals to think twice before they participate in a medical study) possibly more than the overload introduced due to privacy-enhancing

technologies. Similarly, in law enforcement, genomic data (now being used in FBI’s Combined DNA Index System – CODIS) should be managed in a privacy-preserving way to avoid potential future problems (e.g., mistrials, law suits).

In short, we need techniques that will guarantee the security and privacy of genomic data, without significantly degrading the efficiency of the use of genomic data in research and healthcare. Obviously, achieving all of the aforementioned properties would require some compromise. Our expert survey (discussed in Section V) begins to investigate what tradeoffs users of such data would consider appropriate.

V Genomics/Genetics Expert Survey

The field of genomics is relatively young and, its privacy implications are still being refined. Based on *informal* discussions (primarily with computer scientists), we identified eight common beliefs. To investigate the extent to which these beliefs are held by the biomedical community, we designed and obtained Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval to conduct a survey of biomedical professionals regarding security and privacy⁷. Specifically, the survey was designed to inquire about (i) widely held beliefs about genome privacy, (ii) ongoing and existing research directions on genome privacy, and (iii) sharing of an individual’s genomic data. Several prior surveys focused on genome privacy have been conducted and have focused on the perspectives of the general public [Kaufman *et al.*, 2009, 2012; Platt *et al.*, 2013; Cristofaro, 2013] and geneticists [Pulley *et al.*, 2008]. Our survey is novel because it investigates the opinion of biomedical researchers with respect to the intention of data protection by technical means. **We note that our sample size is sufficient to provide statistically meaningful results. Yet, the main goal of the expert survey (opinion poll) is to address many confusions computer scientists have about genomic privacy.**

We conducted our survey both online and by paper. Snowball sampling [Goodman, 1961] was used to recruit subjects for the online survey. This approach enables us to get more responses but the frame is unknown and thus response rate cannot be reported. *We only asked biomedical experts to fill out the survey and asked them to forward it only to biomedical experts.* A URL for the online survey was sent to the people familiar with genomics/genetics (i.e., molecular biology professors, bioinformaticians, physicians, genomics/genetics researchers) known to us and they were asked to forward it to similar people they know. Email and Facebook were used to conduct the survey. Eight surveys were collected by handing out paper copies to participants of a genomics medicine conference. Overall the survey was administered to 61 individuals. Assuming an arbitrarily large population of people familiar with genetics, this sample size provides a confidence interval of 12.5 with a confidence level of 95%, as computed using the formula described in <http://goo.gl/krtGGG>. Approximately 53% of the participants were from the US and 45% from Europe (the rest selected “other”).

⁷Survey form is available at <http://goo.gl/wy7UXH>

The eight beliefs are:

1. Genome privacy is hopeless, because all of us leave biological cells (hair, skin, droplets of saliva,...) wherever we go.
2. Genomic data is not special and should be treated as any other sensitive health data e.g. health record or mental health notes.
3. Genome privacy is irrelevant, because genetics is non-deterministic
4. Genome privacy should be left to bioinformaticians, they can provide better privacy solutions than computer security, privacy and cryptography community can.
5. Genome privacy will be fully guaranteed by legislation
6. Privacy Enhancing Technologies are a nuisance in the case of genetics: genetic data should be made available online to everyone to facilitate research, as done e.g. in the case of the Personal Genome Project
7. Encrypting genomic data is superfluous because it is hard to identify a person from her variants
8. Advantages of genomic based healthcare justify the harm that genome privacy breach can cause.

Figure 2: Beliefs about genomic privacy




Figure 3: Expertise of the survey respondents.

The participants were also asked to report their expertise in genomics/genetics and security/privacy. We show these results in Figure 3.

We now comment on our findings from the survey. The importance of genome privacy has been advertised in several research papers and articles (e.g., [Ayday *et al.*, 2013a]). We asked respondents whether they would share their genomes on the Web (Figure 4). We find that 48% of the respondents are *not* in favor of doing so, while 8% *would* and would go so far as to reveal their identities. 30% of the respondents think that anonymization (or pseudonymization) is sufficient to hide their identity. Recently, Humbert *et. al.* [Humbert *et al.*, 2013] showed that the privacy loss of an individual due to publicly available genomes of his family members is not negligible (discussed in detail in Section VI). Nevertheless, we observe that 39% support the right to publish one’s genome (Figure 5).




Figure 4: Response to the question: *Would you publicly share your genome on the Web?*




Figure 5: Response to the question: *Assuming that one's genomic data leaks lot of private information about his or her relatives, do you think one should have the right to share his or her genomic data?*

As discussed in Section IV, there is a tension between the desire for genome privacy and biomedical research. Thus, we asked the survey respondents what they would trade for privacy. As expected, the results (shown in Figure 6) indicate that the respondents are willing to trade money and test time (duration) to protect privacy, but they usually do not accept trading accuracy or utility.




Figure 6: Response to the question: *What can we compromise to improve privacy of genomic data? (Multiple options can be checked)*

We also asked the respondents to evaluate the importance of existing and ongoing research directions on genomic privacy (as discussed in detail in Section VII), considering the types of problems they are trying to solve (Figure 7). The respondents all agree that privacy is important in all domains (i.e., health-care, research, recreational genomics, legal and forensics) and think that privacy




Figure 7: Relevance of genome privacy research done by computer science community.

is the most important when genomic data is delegated to a third party (e.g., storage in a commercial cloud or outsourcing computation of genomic data to a cloud). The respondents think that privacy is the least important when genomic data is used for research or healthcare issues.

Finally, we asked whether the respondents agree with the beliefs we introduced earlier in this section. We comment on a few important results (Figure 8). First, we observe that 20% of the respondents believe that genome privacy is a




Figure 8: Response to the question: *Do you believe that: (Multiple options can be checked).* “None” means the respondent does not agree with any of the beliefs.

lost cause (Belief 1), while almost half of the respondents consider genomic data to be no different than electronic health data (Belief 2). Even though genomic information is, in most instances, non-deterministic, all respondents agree that this fact does not reduce the importance of genome privacy (in contrast with Belief 3). Only 7% of our respondents think that genome privacy should be left to bioinformaticians (Belief 4). Furthermore, we observe that only 20% of the respondents believe that genome privacy can be fully guaranteed by legislation (Belief 5). Notably, only 7% of the respondents think that privacy enhancing technologies are a nuisance in the case of genetics (Belief 6). According to 11% of the respondents, the confidentiality of genomic data is superfluous because

it is hard to identify a person from her variants (Belief 7). And, finally, only 28% of the respondents think that advantages that will be brought by genomics in healthcare will justify the harm that might be caused by privacy issues (Belief 8). Overall we conclude that the eight beliefs we informally collected do not reflect the opinion of the biomedical community.

VI Known Privacy Risks

In this section, we survey a wide spectrum of privacy threats to human genomic data, as reported by prior research.

VI.A Re-identification Threats

Re-identification is probably the most extensively studied privacy risk in dissemination and analysis of human genomic data. In such an attack, an unauthorized party looks at the published human genomes that are already under certain protection to hide the identity information of their donors (e.g., patients), and tries to recover the identities of the individuals involved. Such an attack, once it succeeds, can cause serious damage to those donors, e.g., discrimination and financial loss. In this section, we review the weaknesses within existing privacy protection techniques that make this type of attack possible.

Pseudo-anonymized Data. A widely used method for protecting health information is the removal of explicit and quasi-identifying attributes (e.g., name and date of birth). Such redaction meets legal requirements to protect privacy (e.g., de-identification under the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) for traditional health records. However, genomic data cannot be anonymized by just removing the identifying information. There is always a risk for the adversary to infer the *phenotype* of a DNA-material donor (that is, the person’s observable characteristics like eye/hair/skin colors), which will lead to her identification, from her *genotypes* (her genetic makeup). Even though the techniques for this purpose are still not there yet, the rapid progress in genomic research and technologies is quickly moving us toward that end. Moreover, re-identification can be achieved through inspecting the *background* information that comes with publicized DNA sequences [Gitschier, 2009; Gymrek *et al.*, 2013; Hayden, 2013]. As an example, genomic variants on the Y chromosome have been correlated with surnames (for males), which can be found out using public genealogy databases. Other instances include identifying Personal Genome Project (PGP) participants through public demographic data [Sweeney *et al.*, 2013], recovering the identities of family members from the data released by the 1000 Genome Project using public information (e.g. death notices)[Malin, 2006], and other correlation attacks [Malin and Sweeney, 2004]. It has been shown that even cryptographically secure protocols leaks a lot of information when used for genomic data [Goodrich, 2009].

Aggregate Genomic Data. In addition to the aforementioned re-identification

threat, which comes from the possible correlation between an individual’s genomic data and other public information, the identity of a participant of a genomic study can also be revealed by a “second sample”, that is, part of the DNA information from the individual. This happens, for example, when one obtains a small amount of genomic data from another individual, such as a small set of her single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), and attempts to determine her presence in a clinic study on HIV, based on anonymized patient DNA data published online. This turns out to be rather straightforward, given the uniqueness of individual’s genome. Particularly, in 2004, research shows that as few as 100 SNPs are enough to uniquely distinguish one individual from others [Lin *et al.*, 2004]. Based on this observation, the genomic researchers generally agree that such DNA raw data are too sensitive to release through online repositories (such as the NIH’s PopSet resources), without proper agreements in place. An alternative is to publish “pooled” data, in which summary statistics are disclosed for the case and control groups of individuals in a study.

Yet, in 2008, Homer and colleagues [Homer *et al.*, 2008] showed that when an adversary had access to a known participant’s genome sequence, they could determine if the participant was in a certain group. Specifically, the researchers compared one individual’s DNA sample to the rates at which her variants show up in various study populations (and a *reference* population that does not include the individual) and applied a statistical hypothesis test to determine the likelihood of which group she is in (i.e., case or reference). *The findings of the work compelled the NIH, as well as the Wellcome Trust in the UK, to remove all publicly available aggregate genomic data from their websites.* Ever since, researchers are required to sign a data use agreement (prohibiting re-identification) to access such data [Zerhouni and Nabel, 2008], the process of which could take several months. At the same time, such attacks were enhanced. First, Homer’s test statistic was improved through exploitation of genotype frequencies [Jacobs *et al.*, 2009], while an alternative, based on linear regression was developed to facilitate more robust inference attacks [Masca *et al.*, 2011]. Wang *et. al.* [Wang *et al.*, 2009a] demonstrated, perhaps, an even more powerful attack by showing that an individual can be identified even from the aggregate statistical data (coefficient of determination $-r^2-$ values) published in research papers. While the methodology introduced in [Homer *et al.*, 2008] requires on the order of 10,000 pieces of genome (of the target individual), this new attack required only on the order of 200. Their approach even shows the possibility of recovering part of the DNA raw sequences for the participants of biomedical studies, using the statistics including p-values and the r^2 .

Quantification of information content in aggregate statistics obtained as an output of genome-wide association studies (GWAS) shows that an individual’s participation in the study and her phenotype can be inferred with high accuracy [Im *et al.*, 2012; Craig *et al.*, 2011]. Beyond these works, it has been shown that a Bayesian network could be leveraged to incorporate additional background information, and thus improve predictive power [Clayton, 2010]. It was recently shown that RNA expression data can be linked to the identity of an individual through the inference of SNPs [Schadt *et al.*, 2012].

Yet, there is debate over the practicality of such attacks. Some researchers believe that individual identification from pooled data is hard in practice [Braun *et al.*, 2009; Sankararaman *et al.*, 2009; Visscher and Hill, 2009; Gilbert, 2008]. In particular, it has been shown that the assumptions required to accurately identify individuals from aggregate genomic data rarely hold in practice [Braun *et al.*, 2009]. Such inference attacks depend upon the ancestry of the participants, the absolute and relative number of people in case and control groups, and the number of SNPs [Masca *et al.*, 2011] and the availability of the second sample. Thus, the false positive rates are much higher in practice. Still, others believe that publication of complete genome wide aggregate results are dangerous for privacy of the participants [Lumley and Rice, 2010; Church *et al.*, 2009]. Furthermore, the NIH continues to adhere to its policy of data use agreements.

Beyond the sharing of aggregate data processing, it should be recognized that millions of people are sequence or genotyped for state of the art GWAS studies. This sequenced data is shared among different institutions with inconsistent security and privacy procedures [Brenner, 2013]. On the one hand, this could lead to serious backlash and fear to participate in such studies. On the other hand, not sharing this data could severely impede biomedical research. Thus, measures should be taken to mitigate the negative outcomes of genomic data sharing [Brenner, 2013].

VI.B Phenotype Inference

Another critical privacy threat to human genome data is inference of sensitive phenotype information from the DNA sequence. Here we summarize related prior studies.

Correlation of Genomic Data. Partially available genomic data can be used to infer the unpublished genomic data due to linkage disequilibrium (LD), a correlation between regions of the genome [Halperin and Stephan, 2009; Marchini and Howie, 2010]. For example, Jim Watson (the discoverer of DNA) donated his genome for research but concealed his ApoE gene, because it reveals susceptibility to Alzheimer’s disease. Yet, it was shown that the ApoE gene variant can be inferred from the published genome [Nyholt *et al.*, 2008]. Such completion attacks are quite relevant in DTC environments, where customers have the option to hide some of the variants related to a particular disease.

Kin Privacy Breach. A significant part of the population does not want to publicly release their genomic data [McGuire *et al.*, 2011]. Disclosures of their relatives can thus threaten the privacy of such people, who never release their genomic data. The haplotypes of the individuals *not* sequenced or genotyped can be obtained using LD-based completion attacks [Kong *et al.*, 2008]. For instance, if both parents are genotyped, then most of the variants for their offsprings can be inferred. The genomic data of family members can also be inferred using data that has been publicly shared by blood relatives and domain-specific knowledge about genomics [Humbert *et al.*, 2013]. Such reconstruction

attacks can be carried out using (i) (partial) genomic data of a subset of family members, and (ii) publicly-known genomic background information (linkage disequilibrium and minor allele frequencies (MAFs)). This attack affects individuals whose relatives publicly share genomic data (obtained using DTC services) on the Internet (e.g. on OpenSNP.org). The family members of the individuals who publish their genomic data on OpenSNP.org can be found on social media sites, such as Facebook [Humbert *et al.*, 2013].

VI.C Other Threats

In addition to the above threats, there are a few other genome-related privacy issues, as follows:

Anonymous Paternity Breach. As mentioned above, the Y chromosome is inherited from father to son virtually intact and genealogy databases link this chromosome to the surname to model ancestry. Beyond the case discussed above, this information has been used to identify sperm donors in several cases. For example, a 15 year boy who was conceived using donor sperm, successfully found his biological father by sending his cheek swab to a genealogy service and doing Internet search [Motluk, 2005; Stein, 2005]. Similarly, an adopted child was able to find his real father with the help of a genealogy database (and substantial manual effort) [Naik, 2009]. In short, DNA testing have made tracing anonymous sperm donors easy and theoretically sperm donors can no more be anonymous [Lehmann-Haupt, 2010].

Legal and Forensic. DNA is collected for legal and forensic purposes from criminals⁸ and victims⁹. On the one hand, forensic techniques are becoming more promising with the evolving technology [Kayser and de Knijff, 2011; Pakstis *et al.*, 2010]. On the other hand, abuse of DNA (e.g., to stage crime scenes) have already baffled people and law enforcement agencies [Bobellan, 2010]. Some people like Madonna (the singer) are paranoid enough about the misuse of their DNA that they hire DNA sterilization teams to clean up their leftover DNA (e.g., stray hairs or saliva) [Villalva, 2012]. We are not aware of any privacy risk assessment studies done primarily in legal and forensic context, in part because law enforcement agencies store a very limited amount of genetic markers. Yet, in the future, it could well happen that law enforcement agencies will have access to the database of whole genome sequences. We discuss sperm donor paternity breach in the next subsection and it is also relevant in legal context.

VII State-of-the-art Solutions

In this section, we provide an overview of technical approaches to address various privacy and security issues related to genomic data. Despite the risks associated

⁸Using DNA to solve crimes, <http://goo.gl/zII3Yo>

⁹What is a Rape Kit, <http://www.rainn.org/get-information/sexual-assault-recovery/rape-kit>

with genomic data, we can find ways to mitigate them to move forward [Altman *et al.*, 2013]. Some solutions are efficient enough for practical use, while others will need further development to become practical. In particular, practical solutions often exploit the special nature of the genomic data to find ways to be efficient under relevant domain assumptions.

VII.A Healthcare

Personalized medicine. Personalized medicine promises to revolutionize healthcare through treatments tailored to an individual’s genomic makeup and genome-based disease risk tests that can enable early diagnosis of serious diseases. Various players have different concerns here. Patients, for instance, are concerned about the privacy of their genomes. By contrast, healthcare organizations are concerned about their reputation and the trust of their clients. And for-profit companies, such as pharmaceutical manufacturers, are concerned about the secrecy of their disease markers (proprietary information of business importance).

A disease risk test can be expressed as a regular expression query taking into account sequencing errors and other properties of sequenced genomic data. Oblivious automata enable regular expression queries to be computed over genome sequence data while preserving the privacy of both the queries and the genomic data [Troncoso-Pastoriza *et al.*, 2007; Frikken, 2009]. Cryptographic schemes have been developed to delegate the intensive computation in such a scheme to a public cloud in a privacy-preserving fashion [Blanton *et al.*, 2012].

Alternatively, it has been shown that a cryptographic primitive called Authorized Private Set Intersection (A-PSI) can be used in this setting [Baldi *et al.*, 2011; Cristofaro *et al.*, 2012]. In personalized medicine protocols based on A-PSI, the healthcare organization provides cryptographically-authorized disease markers, while the patient supplies her genome. In this setting, a regulatory authority, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), can also certify the disease markers before they can be used in a clinical setting. Despite its potential, this protocol has certain limitations. First, it is not very efficient in terms of its communication and computation costs. Second, the model assumes that patients store their own genomes, which is not necessarily the case in practice.

To address the latter issue, it has been suggested that the storage of the homomorphically encrypted variants (e.g., SNPs) can be delegated to a semi-honest third party [Ayday *et al.*, 2013c]. A healthcare organization can then request the third party to compute a disease susceptibility test (weighted average of the risk associated with each variant) on the encrypted variants using an interactive protocol involving (i) the patient, (ii) the healthcare organization and (iii) the third party. Homomorphic encryption based methods can also be used to conduct privacy-preserving computation of disease risk based on both genomic and non-genomic data (e.g., environmental and/or clinical data) [Ayday *et al.*, 2013d]. One of the problems with such protocols, however, is that storage

of homomorphically encrypted variants require orders of magnitude more memory than plaintext variants. However, a trade-off between the storage cost and level of privacy can be composed [Ayday *et al.*, 2013b]. A second problem is that when an adversary has knowledge of the LD between the genome regions and the nature of the test, the privacy of the patients will decrease when tests are conducted on their homomorphically encrypted variants. This loss of privacy can be quantified using an entropy-based metric [Ayday *et al.*, 2013e].

Raw aligned genomic data. Raw aligned genomic data, that is, the aligned outputs of a DNA sequencer, are often used by geneticists in the research process. Due to the limitations of current sequencing technology, it is often the case that only a small number of nucleotides are read (from the sequencer) at a time. A very large number of these “short reads”¹⁰, covering the entire genome are obtained, and are subsequently aligned, using a reference genome. The position of the read relative to the reference genome is determined by finding the approximate match on the reference genome. With today’s sequencing techniques, the size of such data can be up to 300GB per individual (in the clear), which makes public key cryptography impractical for the management of such data. Symmetric stream cipher and order-preserving encryption [Agrawal *et al.*, 2004] provide more efficient solutions for storing, retrieving, and processing this large amount of data in a privacy-preserving way [Ayday *et al.*, 2014].

Genetic compatibility testing. Genetic compatibility testing is of interest in both healthcare and DTC settings. It enables a pair of individuals to evaluate the risk of conceiving an unhealthy baby. In this setting, PSI can be used to compute genetic compatibility, where one party submits the fingerprint for his or her genome-based diseases, while the other party submits her or his entire genome. In doing so, the couple learns their genetic compatibility without revealing their entire genomes [Baldi *et al.*, 2011]. Unfortunately this protocol can leak information about an individual’s disease risk status to the other party and its requirements for computation and communication may make it impractical.

Pseudo-anonymization. Pseudo-anonymization is often performed by the healthcare organization that collects the specimen (possibly by pathologists) to remove patient identifiers before sending the specimen to a sequencing laboratory. In lieu of such information, a pseudonym can be derived from the genome itself and public randomness, independently at the healthcare organization and sequence laboratory for symmetric encryption [Cassa *et al.*, 2013]. This process can mitigate sample mismatch at the sequencing lab. However, since the key is derived from the data that is encrypted using the same key, symmetric encryption should guarantee circular security (security notion required when cipher is used to encrypt its own key), an issue which is not addressed in the published protocol.

¹⁰A short read corresponds to a sequence of nucleotides on DNA. The raw genomic data of an individual consists of hundreds of millions of short reads, each including around 100 nucleotides.

VII.B Research

Genome-wide Association Studies (GWAS). Genome-Wide Association Studies,¹¹ are conducted by analyzing the statistical correlation between the variants of a certain genomic region in a *case group* (i.e., phenotype positive) and *control group* (i.e., phenotype negative). GWAS is one of the most common types of studies performed to learn genome-phenome associations. In GWAS the aggregate statistics (e.g., p-values) are published in scientific articles and are made available to other researchers. As mentioned earlier, such statistics can pose privacy threats as explained in Section VI.

Recently, it has been suggested that such information can be protected through the application of noise to the data. In particular, differential privacy, a well-known technique for answering statistical queries in a privacy preserving manner [Dwork, 2006], was recently adapted to compose privacy preserving query mechanisms for GWAS settings [Fienberg *et al.*, 2011; Johnson and Shmatikov, 2013]. In [Fienberg *et al.*, 2011] the authors propose methods for releasing differentially private minor allele frequencies (MAFs), chi-square statistics, p-values, the top- k most relevant SNPs to a specific phenotype, and specific correlations between particular pairs of SNPs. These methods are notable because traditional differential privacy techniques are unsuitable for GWAS due to the fact that the number of correlations studied in GWAS are much larger than the number of people in the study. However, differential privacy is typically based on a mechanism that invokes Laplacian noise, and thus requires a very large number of research participants to guarantee acceptable levels of privacy and utility. In [Johnson and Shmatikov, 2013], Johnson *et. al.* [Johnson and Shmatikov, 2013] explain that computing the number of relevant SNPs and the pairs of correlated SNPs are the goal of a typical GWAS and are not known in advance. They provide an elegant distance-score mechanism to add noise to the output. All relevant queries required by a typical GWAS are supported including the number of SNPs associated with a disease and locations of the most significant SNPs. Empirical analysis suggests that the new distance score-based differentially private queries produce acceptable privacy and utility for a typical GWAS.

A meta-analysis of summary statistics from multiple independent cohorts is required to find associations in a GWAS. Different teams of researchers often conduct studies on different cohorts and are limited in their ability to share individual-level data due to Institutional Review Board (IRB) restrictions. However, it is possible for the same participant to be in multiple studies, which can affect the results of a meta-analysis. It has been suggested that one-way cryptographic hashing can be used to identify overlapping participants without sharing individual-level data [Turchin and Hirschhorn, 2012].

Sequence comparison. Sequence comparison is widely used in bioinformatics (e.g., in gene finding, motif finding, and sequence alignment). Such comparison is computationally complex. It has been shown that fully homomorphic

¹¹<http://www.genome.gov/20019523>

encryption (FHE), secure multiparty computation (SMC) and other traditional cryptographic tools [Atallah *et al.*, 2003; Jha *et al.*, 2008] can be applied for comparison purposes, but they do not scale to a full human genome. Alternatively, more scalable provably secure protocols exploiting public clouds have been proposed [Blanton *et al.*, 2012; Atallah and Li, 2005]. Computation on the public data can be outsourced to a third party environment (e.g., cloud provider) while computation on sensitive private sections can be performed locally; thus, outsourcing most of the computationally intensive work to the third party. This computation partitioning can be achieved using *program specialization* which enables concrete execution on public data and symbolic execution on the sensitive data [Wang *et al.*, 2009b]. This protocol takes advantage of the fact that genomic computations can be partitioned into computation on public data and private data, exploiting the fact that 99.5% of the genomes of any two individuals are similar.

Moreover, genome sequences can be transformed into sets of offsets of different nucleotides in the sequence to efficiently compute similarity scores (e.g., Smith-Waterman computations) on outsourced distributed platforms (e.g., volunteer systems). Similar sequences have similar offsets, which provides sufficient accuracy, and many-to-one transformations provide privacy [Szajda *et al.*, 2006]. Although this approach does not provide provable security, it does not leak significant useful information about the original sequences.

Until this point, all sequence comparison methods we have discussed work on complete genomic sequences. Compressed DNA data (i.e., the variants) can be compared using novel data structure called Privacy-Enhanced Invertible Bloom Filter [Eppstein *et al.*, 2011]. This method provides communication-efficient comparison schemes.

Person-level genome sequence records. Person-level genome sequence records contrast with the previous methods, which obscure sequences and report on aggregated data rather than that of a single person. Several techniques have been proposed for enabling privacy for personal-level genome sequences. For instance, SNPs from several genomic regions can be generalized into more general concepts – e.g.; transition (change of $A \leftrightarrow G$ or $T \leftrightarrow C$), transversion (change of $A \leftrightarrow C$, $A \leftrightarrow T$, $C \leftrightarrow G$ or $G \leftrightarrow T$), and exact SNP positions into approximate positions) [Lin *et al.*, 2002]. This generalization makes re-identification of an individual sequence difficult according to a prescribed level of protection. In particular, k -anonymity can be used to generalize the genomic sequences such that a sequence is indistinguishable from at least other $k - 1$ sequences. Also, the problem of SNP anonymization can be expanded to more complex variations of a genome using multiple sequence alignment and clustering methods [Malin, 2005b; Li *et al.*, 2012]. However, such methods are limited in that they only work when there are a large number of sequences with relatively small number of variations.

Given the limitations of generalization-based strategies, it has been suggested that cryptographic techniques might be more appropriate for maintaining data utility. In particular, it has been shown that additive homomorphic

encryption can be used to share encrypted data while still retaining the ability to compute a limited set of queries (e.g., secure frequency count queries which are useful to many analytic methods for genomic data) [Kantarcioglu *et al.*, 2008]. Yet, this method leaks information in that it reveals the positions of the SNPs, which in turn reveals the type of test being conducted on the data. Moreover, privacy in this protocol comes at a high cost of computation.

Cryptographic hardware at the remote site can be used as a trusted computation base (TCB) to design a framework in which all person-level biomedical data is stored at a central remote server in encrypted form [Canim *et al.*, 2012]. The server can compute over the genomic data from a large number of people in a privacy-preserving fashion. This enables researchers to compute on shared data without sharing person-level genomic data. This approach is efficient for typical biomedical computations. This approach is limited though in that trusted hardware tends to have relatively small memory capacities, which dictate the need for load balancing mechanisms.

Sequence alignment. Sequence alignment is fundamental to genome sequencing. The increase in the quantity of sequencing data is growing at a faster rate than the decreasing cost of computational power, thus the delegation of read mapping to the cloud can be very beneficial. However, such delegation can have major privacy implications. Chen *et. al.* [Chen *et al.*, 2012] have shown that read mapping can be delegated to the public cloud in a privacy preserving manner using a hybrid cloud-based approach. They exploit the fact that a sequence of small number of nucleotides (≈ 20) is unique and two sequences of equal length with edit distance of x , when divided into $x + 1$ segments will have at least one matching segment. Based on this fact, computation is divided into two parts: (i) the public part is delegated to the public cloud, in which the public cloud finds exact matches on encrypted data and returns small number of matches to the private cloud, whereas (ii) the private part takes place in a private cloud, which computes the edit distance using only the matches returned by the public cloud. This approach reduces the local computation by a factor of 30 by delegating 98% of the work to the public cloud.

VII.C Legal and Forensic

Paternity testing. Paternity testing determines whether a certain male individual is the father of another individual. It is based on the high similarity between the genomes of a father and child (99.9%) in comparison to two unrelated human beings (99.5%). It is not known exactly which 0.5% of the human genome is different between two humans, but a properly chosen 1% sample of the genome can determine paternity with high accuracy [Gibbs and Singleton, 2006]. Participants may want to compute the test without sharing any information about their genomes.

Once genomes of both individuals are sequenced, a privacy-preserving paternity test can be carried out using PSI-Cardinality (PSI-CA), where inputs to PSI-CA protocol are the sets of nucleotides comprising the genome. The size

of the human genome, or even 1% of it, cannot be handled by current PSI and other SMC protocols. However, by exploiting domain knowledge, the computation time can be reduced to 6.8ms and network bandwidth usage to 6.5KB by emulating the Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) chemical test in software, which reduces the problem to finding the intersection between two sets of size 25 [Baldi *et al.*, 2011]. Subsequent work demonstrates a framework for conducting such tests on a Android smartphone [Cristofaro *et al.*, 2012]. Since the ideal output of privacy-preserving paternity test should be yes or no, it cannot be obtained using custom PSI protocols, whereas generic garbled circuit based protocols can be easily modified to add this capability [Huang *et al.*, 2011, 2012].

Criminal forensics. rules enable law enforcement agencies to have unlimited access to the complete DNA record database of millions of individuals, usually of convicted criminals (e.g., CODIS¹² in the US). The motivation behind creating such a database is to find a record that matches the DNA evidence from a crime scene. Yet, providing unlimited access to law enforcement agencies is unnecessary and may open the system to abuse. Cryptographic approaches have been developed to preserve the privacy of the records that fail to match the evidence from the crime scene [Bohannon *et al.*, 2000]. Specifically, DNA records can be encrypted using a key that depends upon certain tests, such that when DNA is collected from a crime scene, the scheme will only allow decryption of the records that match the evidence.

Finally, partial homomorphic encryption can be used for privacy-preserving matching of Short Tandem Repeat (STR) DNA profiles in honest-but-curious model [Bruekers *et al.*, 2008]. Such protocols (described in VII.D) are useful for identity, paternity, ancestry and forensic tests.

VII.D Direct-to-consumer (DTC)

Many DTC companies provide genealogy and ancestry testing. Cryptographic schemes can be used to conduct those tests in privacy-preserving fashion. Partial homomorphic encryption can be cleverly used on STR profiles of individuals to conduct (i) common ancestor testing based on the Y chromosome, (ii) paternity test with one parent, (iii) paternity test with two parents, and (iv) *identity testing* [Bruekers *et al.*, 2008].

Despite the increasing use of DTC genome applications, less focus has been given to the security and privacy of this domain. In particular, genomic data aggregation issues require special attention because some companies allow people to publish high-density SNP profiles online in combination with demographic and phenotypic data.

¹²Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), The Federal Bureau of Investigation, <http://googl/s99EX7>

VIII Challenges for Genome Privacy

While the value of genome sequencing in routine care has yet to be fully demonstrated, it is anticipated that the plummeting cost and commoditization of these analyses will change the practice of medicine. Data confidentiality and individual privacy will be central to the acceptance and widespread usage of genomic information by healthcare systems. However, a clear demonstration of the clinical usefulness of genomics is first needed for doctors and other healthcare providers to fully embrace genomics and privacy.

VIII.A Clinical Implementation

In order for genomics to be widely adopted in the clinical world, it must be woven into existing healthcare structures. The demonstration of scientific validity and clinical utility of genomic testing is an obvious prerequisite, but will not be sufficient if results are not brought to clinicians in an intuitive and timely manner. In particular, genomic data will have to be integrated into more efficient EHRs [Ury, 2013]. These will enable storage and access to data in a secure way, but will also provide appropriate decision support tools that do not require genomic expertise [Overby *et al.*, 2013]. A number of for-profit ventures are offering genome interpretation services to clinicians and hospitals, as well as individual consumers. As such, various models of interactions between health care providers, patients and their personal genomic data are thus likely to grow in the following years.

Another fundamental requirement for large-scale implementation of genomic medicine is genetic education. A strong effort is needed here, oriented both toward healthcare providers and the general population. An increased level of health and genetic literacy will be critical to put patients in a position where they understand the risks and benefits of genomic-based medicine, and as a consequence can make informed decisions. Up until now, genetic information has been put into context for patients undergoing genetic testing by professionals (genetic counselors or geneticists), most often in the highly specialized environment of a genetic division and in the context of Mendelian diseases or reproductive counseling. Because genomics will become ever more an integrative part of medicine, alternative models must be considered in which primary health care providers will have to play a central role [McCarthy *et al.*, 2013].

VIII.B Consumer-driven Genomics

An unprecedented aspect of contemporary genomics that comes with its own set of issues for data confidentiality is democratization, including facilitated access to large-scale personal, health-related data. Whereas medical and genetic information used to be obtainable only through hospital or research laboratories, people can now access their own genotyping or sequencing results through direct-to-consumer companies such as 23andMe, as discussed before. On the research

side, numerous participant-centric initiatives have recently been launched (notably by citizens' networks such as OpenSNP and the Personal Genome Project). As a result, genomic data are increasingly found outside the controlled cocoon of healthcare systems or research. In particular, individual genetic results or aggregated datasets are available on the Internet, often with non-existent or minimal protection. On one hand, these crowd-based initiatives are very exciting, because they have the potential to stimulate biomedical research, accelerate discoveries and empower individuals. Yet, on the other hand, they raise a number of concerns about potential privacy risks (as highlighted in Section IX). For example, privacy risks must here be assessed in the context of the extensive nature of information available on the Internet (including online social networks), and not only within the narrower confines of genomic research or clinical care delivery.

VIII.C Privacy and the Benefits of Genomic Data

It is important to note that both a lack and an excess of privacy have the potential to derail the expected benefits of genomics in healthcare and research. On one hand, the efficient and secured handling of individual genotype and sequence data will be central to the implementation of genomic medicine. The Hippocratic Oath remains a pillar of medical deontology and one of the few stable concepts in the highly tumultuous history of medical practice. Trust is at the core of any successful healthcare system: any leakage of highly sensitive genomic information may raise concerns and opposition in the population and among political decision makers. Earning and conserving trust is essential for hospitals and private companies that deal with genomics. As a result, there is a potential for a service industry securing genomic data, either by providing ad hoc solutions or by fully supporting storage and delivery of raw/interpreted sequence information. Fortunately, as detailed in Section VII, there exists a variety of tools that can mitigate the problem. On the other hand, an excess of privacy-related hurdles could slow down research and interfere with large-scale adoption of genomics in clinical practice. When designing privacy-preserving solutions for genomic data, security and privacy researchers should keep in mind that most end-users are not familiar with computer science and are almost exclusively interested in the clinical utility of test results.

Education is again a fundamental requirement for privacy protection. However, in bioinformatics curricula, students are trained to maximize the information to be extracted from (biological) data. Usually, such curricula do not address security and privacy concerns, because adversarial scenarios are out of their scope. Conversely, computer scientists rarely have formal training in biology, let alone genomics. But, they are better and better trained in security, notably because of the formidable challenge raised by the numerous vulnerabilities of the Internet. Consequently, to properly address the concerns about genomic data protection, there is a clear and strong potential of cross-fertilization between these two disciplines.

VIII.D Acceptable Utility vs. Privacy of Genomic Data

The balance between acceptable utility and privacy of genomic data needs to be considered in context.

Healthcare: patient-level information must be as precise as possible. Because genomic data is used here to support clinical decision, including in life-threatening situations, any decrease in data accuracy must be avoided. Security of electronic medical records and other health-related information is therefore most often guaranteed through restricted access (e.g., intranet use, password and card identification) to unmodified data. It is important to note, however, that genetic testing is rarely urgent, and that privacy-preserving measures that would slightly delay a test result could be tolerated.

Research: research on complex trait genomics relies on large datasets on which genotyping or sequencing association studies can be run. To gain statistical power and detect meaningful associations, it is often necessary to merge many such studies through meta-analyses that can include data from hundreds of thousands of individuals. Due to non-uniform use of technological platforms, to variation in time and place of genotyping, and to differences in analysis pipelines, some degree of noise is then unavoidable. An interesting avenue for research is here to empirically determine whether differential privacy strategies (e.g., [Johnson and Shmatikov, 2013]) can be applied without compromising discovery.

Legal and forensics: DNA collection and search for similarity pattern in genomic data are used in criminal investigations and for other legal purposes like paternity testing. The accuracy of any test result is here again an absolute requirement to avoid legal prejudice. Extremely stringent data protection must also be ensured due to the highly sensitive nature of such cases.

Direct-to-consumer genomics: companies providing individual genomic data have a clear commercial incentive to protect customers' privacy, in order to maintain trust and gain new customers. For example, the 23andMe webpage states: “Your personalized web account provides secure and easy access to your information, with multiple levels of encryption and security protocols protecting your personal information.” Of course, these measures are ineffective when individuals choose to unveil their full identity online together with their genetic information, thereby putting their genome privacy (and one of their relatives) at risk, either knowingly (as in the case of Personal Genome Project participants) or out of naivety.

IX Framework for Privacy-Preserving handling of Genomic data

In this section, we provide a general framework for security and privacy in the handling of genomic data. The framework is illustrated in Figure 9. As has been done throughout this SoK, we divide the framework into four categories: (i) healthcare, (ii) research, (iii) legal and forensics, and (iv) direct-to-consumer genomics. This classification is based on the most popular uses of genomic




Figure 9: Genomic data handling framework: DNA is extracted from an individual’s tissue or cells. DNA is digitized either using sequencing (to obtain Whole Genome Sequence (WGS) or Whole Exome Sequence (WES)) or genotyping (to obtain variants (usually only SNPs)). Reads obtained from sequencing are aligned to form the complete genome, while genotyped variants are digitized from the microchip array directly. Read data may be stored for later analysis. The aligned genome can be either stored in raw form or compressed form (variations from a reference human genome). Medical tests and other types of computation shown in the figure can be performed either on raw aligned genome or just on variants. Possible outputs of computation are shown. Output depends on the type of computation and in some cases there is no output. The figure shows the genomic data aggregation problem caused by recreational genomics services. The figure is divided into three sections based on fundamental limitations of legal and technical measures for the protection of genomic data. Legal protection is required for the left section, legal as well as technical protection is required for the middle section, while, in theory, technical solutions would suffice for the protection of the right section. The legend shows which blocks are associated with different uses of genomic data. *We use the word “patient” in this paper to mean someone who’s genome is sequenced or genotyped and not necessarily a sick person.*

data; however, we recognize that the boundaries between these categories are blurred and there is significant overlap. For each of these we address setting, threat model, and solutions and open problems. The setting provides the most general environment around the problem (e.g., we do not discuss the possibility of outsourcing the computation as one can easily extend our setting to another one involving a third party).

IX.A Biospecimen

DNA is obtained in chemical form and then digitized. This cyber-physical nature of DNA creates unique challenges for its protection.

IX.A.1 Threat Model

In our threat model, the adversary is capable of *(i)* obtaining DNA from an individual’s biological cells either voluntarily (e.g., for research with informed consent) or involuntarily (e.g., leftover hairs or saliva on a coffee cup), *(ii)* sequencing or genotyping the DNA from biospecimen, *(iii)* interpreting the sequenced data to breach identity, disease, kinship, and any other sensitive information, and *(iv)* linking the genomic data (or biospecimen) to the identity, health record, or any arbitrary background information about the individual.

IX.A.2 Solutions and Open Problems

Legal protection is *necessary* to protect the biospecimen and the DNA (in its chemical form). However, a solution to this problem is a subject of public policy and is outside the scope of this paper.

IX.B Digitization: Sequencing/Genotyping

IX.B.1 Setting

A biospecimen is obtained by an agency (e.g., hospital) and is sequenced or genotyped either by the same agency or by an external agency (e.g., Illumina, 23andMe etc.).

IX.B.2 Threat Model

Since a biospecimen is required for digitization, we assume the threat model discussed in Section IX.A.1 with the following extensions: *(i)* the adversary has full control over the entire sequencing or genotyping infrastructure, *(ii)* the adversary can be honest-but-curious and can attempt to learn partial or entire genomic data or any information derived from the genomic data, and *(iii)* the adversary can be malicious and can compromise the integrity of partial or entire genomic data.

IX.B.3 Solutions and Open Problems

Given the cyber-physical nature of DNA, it is not possible to address this issue with technical measures alone. Both legal and technical protections are required to protect against this threat. An external agency cannot derive genomic data without a biospecimen, and legal protection is required to prevent misuse. Sequencing machines are expensive and are manufactured by a limited number of companies. We envision a well-regulated process for the manufacturing, procurement and use of sequencing machines and government regulations

in place for it. The FDA already regulates the manufacturing of medical devices¹³ [Cheng, 2003]. Regular inspections would check for compliance. Under such legal protections, sequencing machines could have tamper resistant trusted computing base (TCB) that could output encrypted data so even the sequencing agency could not legally access the plaintext genomic data. Digital rights management (DRM) based technologies could also be beneficial for sequencing machines.

IX.C Storage

We assume that once the adversary has access to the read data, it is easy to get raw aligned data and variant data, hence we present storage of all three forms of data together.

IX.C.1 Setting

Genomic data can be stored by the (i) patient¹⁴, (ii) healthcare organization (e.g., as part of patient’s EHR), or (iii) a third party.

IX.C.2 Threat Model

For all settings, we assume that the lifetime of genomic data is much longer than the lifetime of a cryptographic algorithm. We consider the following threat models

Patient: Storage media or the device storing genomic data can be lost, stolen or temporarily accessed. A patient’s computer can be attacked by an adversary (curious or malicious) to compromise confidentiality and/or integrity of the genomic data. We further assume that an adversary can associate the identity and background information (including phenotype information) from any arbitrary source. And, we assume that the adversary can use the compromised genomic data for any arbitrary purpose.

Hospital: We consider all of the threats described for the patient and the following additional threats. An insider (or hacker) has full access to the infrastructure and can link genomic information to the phenotypic information in the patient’s health record.¹⁵ We also consider the threat of the healthcare organization communicating incidental findings that are harmful – violating *the right not to know*.¹⁶ We assume that the adversary can intentionally try to figure out variants of regions of the genome from variants in other regions, e.g., to learn some sensitive SNPs removed due to incidental finding issues. We also assume that a healthcare organization could illegally collude with insurance agencies to

¹³<http://goo.gl/I942hy>

¹⁴We use the word patient to mean an individual whose genome is sequenced or genotyped and not necessarily a sick person.

¹⁵We assume that data stored at the hospital is not anonymized.

¹⁶For instance, if a doctor telling a patient that his increased susceptibility to Alzheimer’s, when he doesn’t want to know. We emphasize that defining what is harmful is an ethical issue and is out of scope of this study.

facilitate discrimination based on genomic data.

Third party: We consider all of the threats discussed for the hospital and following additional threats. The adversary, as the third party itself, can be interested in de-anonymizing the anonymized genomic data or aggregate genomic data.

IX.C.3 Solutions and Open Problems

We report some solutions in Section VII. Users are generally not equipped with skills and equipment to protect the security and privacy of their genomic data. For the storage of genomic data, an option is to store it on a cloud in an encrypted fashion, which makes the adversary’s job harder, as now it needs to circumvent cloud storage security measures and also require to hack into user’s computer to steal the decryption key. Efficient encryption schemes allowing secure storage and computation are required.

IX.D Alignment/Assembly

As explained in Section VII, genomic data is obtained from the specimen in the form of short reads. These short reads are then assembled using alignment or assembly algorithms. Alignment is done by comparing the short reads to the reference genome, and is computationally very intensive. Hence, it can be economically beneficial to delegate the alignment to the cloud.

IX.D.1 Setting

Short reads are obtained and alignment is delegated to an untrusted third party.

IX.D.2 Threat Model

We assume that the third party can be honest-but-curious, as well as malicious, and can return incorrect results for economic or other malicious motives.

IX.D.3 Solutions and open problems

We presented some solutions to this problem in Section VII [Chen *et al.*, 2012]. However, there are several problems with the most efficient solution to date. First, it is not provably secure. Second, its security and efficiency requires that the read size be greater than 100 nucleotides. Third, this scheme only works in a hybrid cloud environment and requires local computation. Given that our survey shows that third party environments are of the greatest concern to biomedical researchers, a provably secure and efficient solution that is capable of aligning the human genome in a cloud computing environment is an important open research problem.

IX.E Interpretation

Interpretation depends upon two private inputs: the patient’s genomic data and an interpretation algorithm (possibly from more than one party). Given the complexity of genomic data, it is unlikely that any single party will have a complete interpretation algorithm. This makes the computation a multiparty process between independent parties and the patient. Although each party with a piece of the interpretation algorithm can compute independently with the patient, collusion of any two parties may leak information about another party’s inputs. Moreover, the interpretation of one party may depend upon the interpretation of another party. We assume that all of these parties can be malicious and can collude to learn information (e.g., the patient’s genomic data or another parties’ algorithm). In some cases, it is necessary to sequence one’s parent to draw conclusions, in which case parents might also be concerned about their privacy.

Personalized medicine is a special case of interpretation and depends upon the patient’s genomic data and disease markers (possibly distributed among multiple parties).

Preconception testing is different from personalized medicine because it is a pre-pregnancy test and measures can be taken to conceive a healthy child (as evident from www.counsyl.com success stories). Additionally, the outcome of the preconception test almost *always* depends upon two people, each of whom might prefer to not disclose their genomic status to the other.

IX.E.1 Setting

Computation is typically performed on private data from multiple parties. The parties involved in computation are those who input (i) their genomic data and (ii) interpretation algorithms. The output of the computation should only be released to the patient or authorized physician (possibly using the infrastructure of a healthcare organization).

IX.E.2 Threat Model

We assume that all parties can be honest-but-curious, malicious, or colluding (and possibly all at the same time). They can use arbitrary background knowledge to breach privacy. Furthermore, they may use falsified genomic data, or an interpretation algorithm, an arbitrary number of times to ascertain another parties’ private inputs.

IX.E.3 Solutions and Open Problems

We discussed some of the solutions for the personalized medicine scenario in Section VII. However, current solutions are limited to privacy-preserving disease susceptibility tests. It is clear that computational solutions that support a broad range of computation over genomic data are needed. At the same time,

the design of such systems must be practical because physicians and biomedical scientists have different usability, accuracy and privacy expectations from security and privacy researchers.

IX.F Genome-Wide Association Studies (GWAS)

IX.F.1 Setting

The genomic data from two groups of people are collected, one being the case group (i.e., people with the disease) and the other being the control group (i.e., people without the disease). Statistical analysis is then conducted to discover the correlation between the disease and genetic variants. The results are subsequently published in research papers and posted online possibly with restricted access (e.g., at dbGaP).

IX.F.2 Threat Model

An adversary may wish to determine if the victim is a GWAS participant or blood relative of a GWAS participant. We assume that the adversary has access to the high density SNP profile of the victim and also to a reference population (which can be obtained from the same GWAS conducted on a different population). The attack succeeds if the adversary can gain knowledge from the data produced by GWAS, which she otherwise would not have.

IX.F.3 Solutions and Open Problems

There are various solutions that could be applied in this setting. We explained noise-based solutions, such as differential privacy, in Section VII.B. Yet, differential privacy-based solutions make data more noisy, which make adoption of these approaches difficult. This is particularly problematic because biomedical researchers and physicians want more (not less) accurate data than is available today. An ideal solution should preserve the utility of data while preserving the privacy of participants. We believe that more research is required in this area to determine if noise-based approaches can lead to more usable and pragmatic data publications. These approaches may, for instance, build upon well-established sets of practices from other communities. For example, the Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology (FCSM) has a long history of sharing information in a privacy respective manner. These practices obey multi-level access principles and, to the best of the authors' knowledge, no significant privacy breach from such domain has been reported.

While the data disclosed by federal agencies is quite different from high-dimensional genomic data, it might be possible to adapt practices to balance the benefits and harms caused by public sharing of aggregate genomic data. These strategies may be composed of social and technical protections. From a social perspective, a popular method to mitigate risk is through contractual agreements which prohibit the misuse of such data. Such contracts could be complemented by cryptographic protocols that help preserve the privacy of the

participants, particularly in settings in which the data is used in the secure computation and only the output of the computation is revealed to a specific party.

IX.G Data sharing

The majority of genome-phenome discoveries come from very large populations, sometimes on the order of millions of participants. Given the costs and scarcity of such resources, sharing data would fuel biomedical research. However, sharing this data entails privacy implications as discussed earlier.

IX.G.1 Setting

Genomic data needs to be shared among different research institutions, possibly under different jurisdictions. Privacy-preserving solutions can be built in the following settings: *(i)* all data delegated to and computation done on a trusted party (e.g., a governmental entity), *(ii)* all data delegated to and computation done on an untrusted party, *(iii)* all data stored at and computation done at the collection agency, *(iv)* sharing data using data use agreements, and *(v)* sharing anonymized data.

IX.G.2 Threat Model

We assume that data is being shared between untrusted parties. The parties with whom data is being shared may want to use it for any arbitrary purpose, including using it for participant re-identification, or for finding disease susceptibility of the patients and his blood relatives. We also assume that once the data is shared, it can be used in an arbitrary manner.

IX.G.3 Solutions and Open Problems

We described some solutions in Section VII.B. However, these solutions do not allow for arbitrary computations on encrypted data. Theoretically, many cryptographic solutions exist to solve this issue. For example, fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) can be used to encrypt the data and arbitrary computations can be done on it while preserving privacy, but data needs to be decrypted by the party that encrypted the data. Functional encryption (FE) could also be used, through which any arbitrary function can be computed on encrypted data. However, FHE and FE are not sufficiently efficient to be practically useful. The performance of FHE and FE is progressing and these schemes might be usable in the future to support data sharing. Clearly though, specialized efficient solutions for genomic data exploiting nature of genomic data are needed to support specific analytics.

IX.H Paternity

Genomic data is extensively used to determine parentage and test results are admissible in courts of law. Today, the biospecimen of the individuals involved in the tests are outsourced to a third party in the form of cheek swabs, where the DNA is extracted. Sending one's DNA to a third party could have serious implications for one's privacy.

IX.H.1 Setting

Two parties each have their sequenced genome or variants and one party wants to know whether the other party is the patient.

IX.H.2 Threat Model

The threat model in this case is the standard model defined for secure two-party computations. We assume that parties can be honest-but-curious or malicious.

IX.H.3 Solutions and Open Problems

In Section VII, we explain some of the solutions to the problem. A chemical test – RFLP – can be simulated for a neat and efficient privacy-preserving solution, given that genomes are stored by individual's themselves [Baldi *et al.*, 2011]. Yao's garbled circuits can be used instead of PSI to output a binary answer (YES or NO) instead of the number of matched segments in simulated RFLP test.

IX.I Forensic DNA Databases

Many countries maintain a huge database of DNA profiles of convicted (and, in some cases, accused) criminals. Law enforcement agencies usually have unlimited access to such a resource, which makes it vulnerable to abuse. It is possible that in near future, instead of concise DNA profiles, law enforcement agencies will be able to have access to full genome sequences of individuals, which further exacerbates the issues.

IX.I.1 Setting

Police officers collect DNA samples from a crime scene. Then, they want to check whether an individual with the same DNA profile/sequence is present in the DNA records database.

IX.I.2 Threat Model

We assume that the adversary can be honest-but-curious, interested in learning about other people in the database. In addition, if the adversary has write access to the database, he can also try to compromise the integrity of the record(s) in

the database. We also assume that the adversary is able to affect the outcome of a query in arbitrary manner.

IX.I.3 Solutions and Open Problems

We discussed some of the existing solutions to this problem in Section VII. Theoretically, this problem differs from interpretation and other types of computation, as the privacy for query is not required, only the privacy of the individuals other than the suspect is of concern here. This makes the problem more tractable, possibly making solutions scalable to large databases with millions of records.

IX.J Recreational Genomics

Several commercial companies offer direct-to-consumer genomics services. They include kinship, ancestry and partner compatibility testing.

IX.J.1 Setting

The customer ships her specimen (usually saliva) to a company. This specimen is used to genotype typically one million SNPs and the data is then digitized and stored in digital form on the server. Some computation is done on this data for ancestry, disease susceptibility, kinship or other tests. The data and the results are then available for the user to download or see through a browser. Some companies (e.g., 23andme) allow to search for people with common ancestors e.g., 3rd, 4th or 5th cousins.

IX.J.2 Threat Model

We assume the threat models for specimen collection, digitization and interpretation. There are also new threats. The owner of the data posts his data online along with his identity and some phenotypical data, as done for example on openSNP.org. We assume that the data owner makes an informed decision, so he willingly gives away his genome privacy. The major threat then is to the blood relatives of the data owner, whose private information is also leaked.

Genomic data aggregation is another issue caused by users posting their genomic data online. This data can be aggregated by companies and then used for commercial or other purposes. It is worth noting that some genome-sharing websites have an achievement programs where users get rewards whenever they post their phenotype data (e.g., hair color, eye color, disease pre-disposition etc.). Genomic data along with phenotypic data is much more valuable than genomic data alone.

IX.J.3 Solutions and Open Problems

All other solutions apply here, however recreational genomics presents new problems of public sharing and genomic data aggregation. We emphasize that public

awareness is required to enable people to make an informed decision to share their genomic data publicly and thus compromising their own and their relatives' privacy. It should be made clear that in case of abuse of this publicly available data, people would be discouraged to share genomic data even for legitimate research purposes. However, this is a policy and ethics debate and is out of scope of this paper.

Conclusion

The confluence of cheap computing and high-throughput sequencing technologies is making genomic data increasingly easy to collect, store, and process. At the same time, genomic data is being integrated into a wide range of applications in diverse settings (e.g., healthcare, forensics, consumer-related products), such that privacy and security issues have yet to be sufficiently defined and addressed. For instance, massive computation capability is needed to analyze genomic data for research purposes, such that the cloud is likely to play a large role in the management of such data. At the same time, genomic data will be used in specific applications (e.g., forensics) where mobile computing environments (e.g., tablets and smartphones) will be routinely used to access those data. And, genomic data will be increasingly available on the Web, especially in citizen-contributed environments, (e.g., online social networks). While some individuals are sharing such information, there are significant privacy concerns because it is not known what such information is capable of revealing, or how it will be used in the future.

As such, there is a clear need to support personalized medicine, genomic research, forensic investigation and recreational genomics while respecting privacy. Computing is a crucial enabler, but can also be the first source of leakage if appropriate mechanisms are not put in place. Our survey (opinion poll from the biomedical community) provides some insight into what may be the most important aspects of the problem to study. And, along these lines, we have provided a review of the state-of-the-art regarding computational protection methods in this field, as well as the main challenges moving forward. To assist the data privacy and security community to develop meaningful solutions, we have provided a framework to facilitate the understanding of the privacy-preserving handling of genomic data.

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